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ABSTRACT ; This paper surveys work in development economics that emphasizes
a general equilibrium point of view. In particular the following
topics are considered from this viewpoint: public inputs, rural
urban migration, educated unemployment, ethnic groups, apartheid,
forced labor and North-South trade. The importance of economic
theory as well as interdisciplinary studies is emphasized.

In this lecture I shall present to you a variety of topics which
are typically not dealt with in textbooks of development economics and
whose study, it seems to me, will advance the understanding of our sub-
ject. If there is any commonality in the topics that I choose, it lies
more in the underlying method of investigation than in substance. What
I hope to bring out is the importance and fruitfulness of economic
theory
—
particularly neoclassical economic theory—in giving us insight
not only into topical questions but also into the structure of the
economic systems concerning which these questions are posed. In addi-
tion, I hope to emphasize what any theoretical result makes explicit;
namely that it is based on assumptions and to the extent that it
increases our understanding of a particular economic phenomenon, it
also increases our lack of understanding of all those economic pheno-
mena not covered by those assumptions.
This lecture is then meant to be partly a review, partly a program
of research, and partly a set of conjectural analogies. It is clearly
not meant to be a "state of the art" summary of a particular area of
2development economics, as a Handbook Chapter, or a detailed analysis of
a particular model, or a justification and elaboration of a particular
policy recommendation. I also want to make clear at the outset that by
saying that a particular topic is neglected, I do not mean to assert
its overriding importance in relation to other topics—simply that it
also deserves study.
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1. An Excursion into Methodology
Since this is a lecture on the application of neoclassical theory,
it is incumbent on me to make clear my view of theory and of its
strengths and its limitations.
To begin with, I subscribe to Popper's basic idea that theory pre-
3
cedes observation. He writes:
Science cannot start with observations, or with the
collection of data. Before we can collect data, our
interest in data of a certain kind must be aroused:
Or again:
the problem always comes first.
4
Observation is always observation in the light of
theories.
Or yet again:
Clearly the instruction, 'Observe' is absurd.
Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen
object, a definite task, an interest, a point of
view, a problem.
Finally,
We are born with expectations; with 'knowledge'
which is prior to all observational experience. One
of the most important of these expectations is the
expectation of finding a regularity. It is connected
with an inborn propensity to look out for regularities
or with a need to find regularities.
The second idea that I want to put before you relates to Hayek's
distinction between simple and complex phenomena, that social sciences
belong to the latter and that it is a misplaced hope that methods which
have succeeded in the study of simple phenomena will necessarily
7
succeed in the study of complex phenomena. Indeed, Hayek writes:
A simple theory of phenomena which are in their nature
complex is probably merely of necessity false.
For complex phenomena,
-3-
We are interested not only in individual events (but)
equally interested in the recurrence of abstract
patterns as such; and the prediction that a pattern
of a certain kind will appear in defined circumstances
is a falsifiable (and therefore empirical) statement.
Such a theory destined to remain algebraic because we
are unable to substitute particular values for the
variables, ceases then to be a mere tool and becomes
the final result of our theoretical efforts.
9
Keynes, in his letter to Roy Harrod, goes somewhat further
It seems to me that economics is a branch of logic,
a way of thinking; and that you do not repel suffi-
ciently firmly attempts a_ la Schultz to turn it into
a pseudo-natural science. The grave fault of the
later classical school has been to overwork a too
simple or out-of-date model, and in not seeing that
progress lay in improving the model; whilst Marshall
often confused his models by wanting to be realistic
and by being unnecessarily ashamed of lean and
abstract outlines. But it is of the essence of a
model that one does not fill in real values for the
variable functions. To do so would make it useless
as a model. For as soon as this is done, the model
loses its generality and its value as a mode of
thought.
Finally, we have a denial of the existence of laws in the social
10
sciences
:
We may have an elaborate or useful theory about some
kind of complex phenomena and yet have to admit that
we do not know of a single law which this kind of
phenonema obeys.
Thus, like the mathematician, an economic theorist is a discoverer
of patterns. However, unlike a mathematician's patterns, ours are not
judged primarily on the basis of their beauty, by which one may mean
12
a very high degree of unexpectedness combined with inevitability and
economy," or even on the basis of their seriousness if by this one
13
means "a certain generality and a certain depth." The seriousness
of our patterns is rather judged by how they help us to chart out, in
-4-
Hayek, s phrase, "the consequences of human action but not of human
design" or in Merton's conception of the "unanticipated consequences of
• i -• »
15 n 16purposive social action. Popper puts it thus:
The main task, of theoretical social sciences is to
trace the unintended social repercussions of inten-
tional human actions.
Indeed, one may further quote Nagel:
Social phenomena are not generally the intended
results of individual actions; nevertheless the
central task of social science is the explanation
of phenomena as the unintended outcome of springs
of action.
18
Finally, in the words of Arrow:
The appreciation that the workings of institutions
are very different from the intentions of the agents
are among the lessons of economic theory.
19
From all of this, it is but one short step to Myrdal's 1929 plea:
It should be one of the main tasks of applied economics
to examine and unravel the complex interplay of
interests as they sometimes converge, sometimes con-
flict. This ought to be done by economists because the
intricacies of the price system are such that interests
often run along different lines than those suggested by
a superficial examination. We could offer alternative
solutions, each one corresponding to some special
interests.
20
In 1972, Arrow rejected "on both logical and historical grounds
the widespread suspicion that neoclassical economics is simply an apo-
logy for the status quo ." In this quotation I would only substitute
the word "necessarily" for "simply." It all depends on the problems
that are posed and the questions that are asked. I hope that this lec-
ture will further underscore this.
-5-
2. An Excursion into Trade Theory
Next, I would like to present the principal features of three models
which constitute, by and large, the essentials of the pure theory of
21
international trade. These models furnish, in my view, an indispensible
tool-kit for tackling those problems in development economics in which
agent interaction is an essential and complicating factor. Two of these
22
models have already been presented in the, by now, famous lectures
delivered by Harry Johnson at the Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics in 1956 and in 1958. I shall therefore emphasize more recent
developments.
Certain features are common to all three models and can be easily
summarized. In each, the technology is assumed to be such that two
final outputs, say clothing and food, are produced under constant
returns to scale, without joint production and using a certain number
of primary inputs. The economy is considered too small to influence
the international prices of its outputs, both of which are traded in
international markets. The factor endowments are allocated between the
two outputs on the basis of perfect competition, i.e., marginal produc-
tivity pricing. Thus, the parameters are factor endowments and output
prices and the unknowns are the quantities of outputs produced, the
allocation of the factors and the rates of return to these factors.
It is simply the variation in the number of primary factors that
distinguishes the three prototypical models. If there is only one pri-
mary input, say labor, we obtain a model associated with the name of
Ricardo. With two primary inputs, say labor and capital, each of which
is intersectorally mobile, we obtain the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS)
-6-
model. Finally, with three intersectorally mobile primary inputs, say
labor, capital and land, we obtain the neoclassical model, a special
case of which has been extensively studied recently. If the first two
models can be abbreviated as 2x1 and 2x2, this special case termed the
Ricardo-Viner (RV) model, is 2x3 but with the added condition that only
labor is intersectorally mobile and the other two factors are sector-
specific and non-shif table.
In a Ricardian two-country world, each country specializes in
the commodity in which the average productivity of labor is higher.
The crucial insight here is that this comparison of labor productivities
is made within a country and NOT across countries. This is, of course,
the celebrated comparative costs theorem. Once the pattern of pro-
duction is determined, the allocation of labor within each country is
trivially determined. The wage is determined on the basis of average
(and equivalently marginal) productivities of the sector which is pro-
ducing positive output and the international prices, along with the
proportions of imports and exports are determined by the individual
country demand for food and clothing.
This outcome of complete international specialization no longer
necessarily obtains in the HOS model. Under incomplete specialization,
such a model exhibits what may be called a decomposibility property
whereby some of the unknowns can be determined in isolation from the
others and on the basis of only a subset of the parameters. I refer,
of course, to the determination of factor returns, wages and rentals,
on the sole basis of international prices. This is simply a consequence
of the fact that under perfect competition prices are equated to unit
-7-
costs in each sector, and since these costs depend on factor returns,
we obtain two equations in two unknowns. Obvious as this fact is, its
economic consequences bear emphasis. It asserts that changes in the
amount of labor or capital have no effect on their returns if the
economy remains incompletely specialized.
The two equations, two unknowns subsystem allows us to chart out
the effects of changes in international prices on wages and rentals
and hence on the distribution of income between capital and labor.
This, of course, leads us to the theorem of Stolper-Samuelson which
asserts that a change in an international price, say as brought about
by a tariff, leads to an unambiguous improvement in the income of one
factor and to an unambiguous decline in that of the other. Which
factor gains depends on the ranking of the ratio of factor-shares
between the two sectors or, in the jargon, on the ranking of value
intensities .
Once international prices fix domestic factor prices and hence the
choice of technique, i.e., capital-labor ratios in each sector, we can
determine the effect of changes in factor endowments on production
levels. This, of course, leads us to the theorem of Rybczynski whereby
an increase in, say labor, increases the production of one output and
decreases that of the other. Which sector expands depends on the
ranking of the capital-labor ratios between the two sectors, or again
23in the jargon, on the ranking of physical intensities .
There are other results on the HOS model such as those pertaining
to magnification or reciprocity which are equally pretty but for which
I do not have time. However, it is worth underscoring that once we
-8-
embed the HOS model in a two country setting, we can locate factor
endowments as the sole determinants of the pattern of trade. This is,
of course, the celebrated Heckscher-Ohlin theorem of comparative advan-
tage.
All of this was known to Harry Johnson when he lectured in 1956.
Subsequent work focused on a situation in which an exogenous differen-
tial was postulated between the factor returns accruing in the two sec-
tors. Such a differential was rationalized on the basis of a trade
union, or a tax or, more generally, some unspecified factor market
distortion. Such a differential could lead to a situation when the
ranking based on value intensities did not coincide with that based on
physical intensities. This reversal of rankings led to a series of
paradoxes, an important one of which is that the supply curves of the
two outputs could be downward sloping. Once such perverse price-output
responses are established, it became a simple exercise to overturn a
variety of results of both a positive and a normative bent.
A contribution which straightens out the ensuing chaos is that of
27
Neary. He showed that under reasonable adjustment processes, be they
Marshallian or Walrasian, the coincidence of the rankings of the two
sectors is both a necessary and sufficient condition for (global
asymptotic) stability of equilibrium. As such these paradoxes were of
limited consequence.
Once we turn to the Ricardo-Viner model, the decomposibility pro-
perty is the first that has to be jettisoned. This is simply on
account of the fact that the two international prices are not suf-
ficient to determine the three factor prices; namely wages and capital
-9-
and land rents. Once the decoraposibility property goes, factor
endowments have a say in the determination of factor returns and hence
the distribution of income between labor, capital and land. An
increase in the mobile factor, say labor, increases both outputs,
depresses the wage and increases the returns to the sector-specific
factors. An increase in the sector-specific factor on the other hand,
increases the output in its own sector, decreases that in the other,
depresses its own return and that of the mobile factor and increases
the return to the other specific factor. All these are standard
results and there are no surprises here. One need only underscore the
neoclassical ambiguity as regards the effect of an increase in an out-
put price on the distribution of income. This leads to an increase in
the return to the mobile factor if this return is measured in terms of
the good whose price has not increased, but a decrease in terms of the
good whose price has risen. This result then argues that knowledge of
the expenditure patterns of labor are of consequence in the effects of
tariffs on their real income levels.
3. Public Inputs
With these preliminaries out of the way, I can now get to the sub-
stance of the lecture. The first topic that I want to present relates
to inputs which can be used up fully by one sector and yet leave an
identical amount available for the other. These are public inputs as
28formulated by Lindahl, Musgrave and Samuelson. Obvious examples of
such inputs are weather reports, flood control programs, provision of
infrastructure, programs aimed at reducing salinity and water-logging
and undoubtedly many others. It is well-known that the "free market"
-10-
cannot handle such commodities in the sense of providing an "optimal"
supply. The basic problem has to do with incentives. Given that a
particular producer can enjoy the benefits of reduced salinity or take
the advantage of weather reports, it is obviously in his interest to
understate his demand, and hence his willingness to pay, for such com-
modities. And, of course, what is in the interest of one producer is
obviously in the interest of all producers and hence the public input
is undersupplied.
Suppose, however, these incentive problems are overcome and we
assume, along with Lindahl, that all agents truthfully reveal their
demands for the public inputs. The question still remains as to which
of the prototypical models of Section 2, if any, apply.
For concreteness , consider a situation in which food and clothing
are produced with the help of intersectorally mobile labor and capital
and a public input which is also produced by labor and capital. Let
the public input be, in the terminology of Meade, of the unpaid-factor
type
,
which means that there are constant returns to scale in each sec-
tor in terms of all the three inputs. Finally, let there be Lindahl
pricing for the public input which is to say that each producer pays for
the public input the value of its marginal revenue product. Given that
the public input is non-traded internationally, we are formally in a
2x2 world of HOS. However, a moment's reflection will convince us that
29
none of the HOS results apply. Nevertheless the questions which we
asked of the HOS model can also be asked of our public input model and
are as deserving of answers.
-11-
Once we abandon Lindahl pricing and impose taxes based on some ad-
hoc criterion, the questions become more interesting. If, for example,
the cost of the public input are shared on some proportional basis, and
laobr markets are perfect, one is obviously interfering in the market
for the remaining input, capital. Thus, more realistic pricing rules
for public inputs introduce distortions in other factor markets.
It is certainly not my intention to try and answer these questions
here. My sole purpose in raising them is to bring out their impor-
tance for issues that are of interest to both development economists
and trade theorists. For details as to some preliminary answers, I
30 31
refer you to the work of Manning-McMillan, Negishi, Tawada-
32
a, A u 33 r . . 34 35Okamoto, Tawada-Abe, Ishizawa and my own.
4. Urban Unemployment
Next, I would like to discuss urban unemployment. This is a per-
vasive problem for LDC's and it is natural to ask why such unemployment
does not act as a sufficient deterrent for rural-urban migration. An
idea which has proved fruitful in this context is Co consider an alter-
native equilibrium condition in the labor market, one that substitutes
equality of expected wages for the equality of nominal wages. A
migrant leaves a secure rural wage and accepts the risk of urban
unemployment because his expected urban wage is higher, with the rate
of urban unemployment serving as an index for the probability of his
finding a job. This idea has now come to be known in the literature as
the Harris-Todaro hypothesis but it was very much in the air around,
the late sixties as can be seen from the contemporaneous writings of
-12-
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Akerlof-Stiglitz, Blaug et . al., Harberger, Knight and un-
doubtedly others.
The Harris-Todaro hypothesis introduces a further unknown; namely
the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Indeed, that is its raison
d'etre . Thus, if it can be buttressed by a theory of urban wage deter-
mination, we have a well-articulated model which can be used to answer
a variety of questions. The easiest hypothesis, one that was adopted
41by Harris-Todaro and by Bhagwati-Srinivasan, is simply to assume a
rigid urban wage and rationalize it, for example, as a consequence of
government fiat. However, in the seventies, several theories of
endogeneous urban wage determination have been proposed. Foremost
42
among these is the work of Joseph Stiglitz who provides a microfoun-
43dation for the urban wage in terms of labor-turnover, or in terms of
44
efficiency considerations. One may also mention here the work of
45
Calvo who sees an urban wage as an outcome of trade union behavior.
A natural question arises as to whether all these various models
can be sythesized into one. In 1980, I proposed such a generalized
46Harris-Todaro model but the essential reason for such a synthesis
appears to have been missed even in the trade literature. It does not
require too much imagination to subsume several models into one, more
general, model. Indeed, this is one of the more obvious advantages of
the mathematical method. What is important is whether this general
model allows us to see relationships and patterns which were obscured
when we dealt with the individual special cases and more importantly,
t
whether it allows us to ask, and answer, questions which did not
suggest themselves before. Let me speak to these points in the context
of the generalized Harris-Todaro model.
-13-
The essential idea is that the various theories of wage determin-
ation that have been proposed can be summarized in a simple function,
for want of a better name, the omega function, relating the urban wage
47
to the rural wage, unemployment rate and rentals. Once such a function
is considered, along with the Harris-Todaro hypothesis, as part of a
two-sector model, we obtain a model in which the HOS and RV model live
48
as special cases. This observation then naturally suggests an investi-
gation into the question as to whether the basic properties of these
special models carry over to the generalized model.
Consider the generalized HT model patterned on the HOS setting. In
such a model, capital and labor are the only two primary inputs, capital
markets are perfect, urban wages are determined by the omega function
and the Harris-Todaro hypothesis holds for the labor markets. Other
features remain unchanged and are as discussed in Section 2.
A moment's reflection will now convince you that the decomposability
property holds for the generalized HT model. This is a simple conse-
quence of the fact that the two "price equals unit cost" equations, the
Harris-Todaro equilibrium condition and the omega function are suf-
ficient to determine the three factors returns and the urban unemploy-
49
ment rate. Thus, not only are factor returns independent of the level
of factor endowments as in the HOS set-up, but this independence also
extends to the equilibrium rate of urban unemployment. It is now a
routine matter to derive the analogues of the Stolper-Sarauelson and
the Rybczynski theorems. The only modification relates to the fact
that they depend on rankings derived from rather more elaborate cri-
teria. The effects of price changes on the distribution of income and
-14-
the equilibrium rate of unemployment depend on what I have elsewhere
termed the elasticity adjusted factor intensities. Similarly, the
effects of changes in factor endowments on output levels depend on
unemployment adjusted factor intensities. It is reassuring that in the
case when the omega function simply equates the urban and rural wages,
i.e., in the HOS setting, our modified factor intensities collapse to
the value and physical intensities I mentioned in Section 2.
At this point, a natural question arises as to the existence of
reasonable adjustment processes which converge to an equilibrium of the
generalized HT model if and only if there is a coincidence of the
rankings determined by the two factor intensity criteria. I have pro-
vided such an adjustment process in a PDR paper. However, it is worth
stating that there also exist adjustment processes of the Walrasian
type, i.e., pertaining to price adjustments, for which the result does
, 52
not hold. It is also worth pointing out that in the special case of
rigid urban wages, the elasticity adjusted rankings collapse to a posi-
tive constant and thus the result reduces solely to a requirement on
the employment adjusted factor intensities as being both a necessary
53
and a sufficient for stability equilibrium. This result has also
54
been shown by Neary but he shows no awareness, even in his subsequent
writing, that the relevant guidepost for his stability result is his
earlier stability theorem for the HOS, wage-differential, set-up.
Indeed, an additional question suggests itself. In a pioneering
analysis of the generalized HT model but with rigid urban wages,
Corden-Findlay discovered, what can now be termed, the Corden-Findlay
paradox. This is the curious result that a subsidy to urban employ-
ment does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the amount of urban
-15-
unemployment . One can ask whether the Corden-Findlay paradox, as well
as paradoxes pertaining to other policy changes, occurs if and only if
the rankings under the two factor intensities do not coincide. I have
58
pursued this question in detail in my quoted paper.
There are several other questions on which the generalized Harris-
59
Todaro model sheds light. These relate to immiserizing growth, nega-
. , . 60 . ., . . . 61tive social opportunity costs, the Brecher-Alejandro proposition,
taxes on capital, and undoubtedly others to follow. In each instance
the corresponding HOS or RV result is the relevant pointer but the
richer setting of the generalized model offers additional consequences
and qualifications. 1 certainly do not have any time for even a cur-
sory discussion of these topics but I feel I must say a few words on
the question of gains from trade in the presence of urban unemployment.
There is by now a substantial literature on the question of gains
from international trade and on the optimality of tariffs. The effect
of trade on unemployment rates is an important policy question and the
generalized HT model, in either its HOS or RV variants, is well suited
to answering this. However, what needs to be underscored even more is
that the generalized HT departs from the total symmetry of the trade
theory constructions I discussed in Section 2. The fact that the
clothing sector is the export or import sector is totally irrelevant to
the results. In our examination of the question of gains from trade in
the generalized HT model in a PDR paper, Lin Po-Sheng and I found that
the results are sensitive to the commodity being exported. Given the
asymmetric nature of the distortion and the direction of migration,
such a sensitivity is not at all surprising. However, to my knowledge,
-16-
it does not seem to have been emphasized, or even noticed, in the trade
64
theory literature.
5. Educated Unemployment
It is not an uncommon phenomenon in several Asian LDC ' s that a non-
negligible proportion of their educated labor force is either unemployed
or underemployed in the sense that individuals are working in jobs
for which they are grossly "overqualif ied . " Nevertheless, this does
not act as a sufficient deterrent to the demand for higher education.
In more concrete terms, university enrollment in graduate programs in
(say) English Literature or Theoretical Physics remains high despite
the fact that graduates in these subjects make their living by driving
taxicabs. There is, of course, a natural analogy to the problem of
rural-urban migration and the resulting urban unemployment but in the
educated unemployment setting, the problem has an intertemporal rather
than a spatial dimension. Simply put, an economic agent has the option
of obtaining an income stream with certainty as an unskilled laborer or
another stream, the present value of which is presumably higher but
uncertain, as a skilled worker. Just as in the Harris-Todaro hypothesis,
the demand for education is generated by an equilibrium condition which
equates the present value of these streams, with the expected rate of
educated unemployment quantifying the probability of getting a job after
graduation.
These ideas have been precisely formulated and articulated in the
66
context of general equilibrium models by Bhagwati, Hamada and Srinivasan
but their full implications for a dynamic setting have yet to be derived.
In the remainder of this section, I discuss some preliminary work in this
connection.
-17-
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In a PDR paper, Datta Chaudhuri and I present an extension of
a model due to Findlay-Rodriguez. We consider a two-sector economy
which produces a Solow-good which can be consumed or accumulated in the
69
form of physical capital and increments to the educated labor force.
The Solow-good is produced by three inputs, capital and skilled and
unskilled labor whereas the educated labor force is produced by capital
and educated labor. The aggregate labor force grows at an exogenously
given rate and a constant proportion of the GNP is invested in capital
stock. We thus have a two sector, three input, two asset model in
which portfolio choice is regulated by an equilibrium condition dic-
tating that the expected rates of return from investment in capital or
investment in education must be the same. This is an interesting model
which permits the study of temporary equilibria, those in which capi-
tal stock and the size of the educated labor force is fixed, as well
as equilibria which will obtain in the steady state. Moreover, one
can ask as to the effects of educational subsidies or of changes in
saving propensities, not only on the equilibrium values of the capital
stock but also on the values of educated unemployment and the steady
state size of the educated labor force. I refer you to the paper for
details as well as possible extensions.
6 . Ethnic Groups
Next, I would like to discuss a problem that is common to most
LDC's. This is the presence of economically and socially disadvantaged
groups whose advancement is a matter of official policy. Such policy
typically takes the form of minimum wage legislation, employment quotas,
-18-
regional subsidies and specially targeted development expenditures, all
aimed at specific groups. It is natural to ask whether such policies
succeed in accomplishing what they are intended to do. Put dif-
ferently, one can ask whether a particular employment quota increases
the employment, and more generally welfare, of the group it is aimed at
once all the economic repercussions are taken into account. I would
like to present a model which can be used to answer such questions.
Consider a economy with many ethnic groups, each of whom is easily
identifiable, and each of whom is engaged in some economic activity,
typically agriculture, in their own rural region. There is also a city
in which all these ethnic groups can be employed in the production of
some output, say manufacturing. There is migration between each region
and the urban centre but not between the regions. Let us suppose that
all outputs, rural or urban, can be internationally traded and that the
economy is too small to influence these prices.
Rural urban migration is regulated according to the Harris-Todaro
hypothesis but with the additional wrinkle that a member of the i-th
ethnic group calculates his expected wage only on the basis of urban
unemployment specific to his group. This is in part a reflection of
the fact that information about employment possibilities in the city
flows solely through members of the relevant ethnic group who are
already in the city. In addition, this modification also takes account
of the fact that during the period when he is unemployed and looking
for a city job, a migrant has to fall back for support on the employed
members of his tribe or region.
-19-
Finally, we postulate that the urban employer takes advantage of
the segmented nature of his labor force and sets different wages for
different groups. In the jargon of the previous section, there is a
different omega function for each ethnic group.
Now all the ingredients of our model are complete. Our unknowns
are the allocation of the members of each ethnic group among the urban
city, the relevant rural region and the unemployed pool; the urban and
rural wage of each group; the return to the rural landlords and that to
the urban capitalist. The parameters are the international prices and
factor endowments.
As I have had occasion to emphasize elsewhere, the basic structure
of this model is that of the RV model, and rather than dwell on the
72
results, let me indicate directions in which the model could be further
extended.
73
One obvious extension relates to a land-surplus as opposed to a
labor-surplus economy. This would be the case when regional output is
produced under constant returns to scale with the help of labor and
capital and that this capital is intersectorally mobile. This furnishes
a specific way of linking the rural regions among themselves in addi-
tion to the linkage through the city. I have not had the opportunity
to examine this set-up in detail but it is clear that the relevant
pointer is the HOS model and that the results for the sector-specific
case will be overturned. Incidentally, this extension also suggests
another disaggregated version of the HOS model, a topic that seems to
be coming back in fashion.
-20-
Another extension relates to that arising from an attempt to apply
the model to international migration. It suggests the individual
rationality of a country paying different wages to incoming groups of
workers who are identical in all respects except their nationality.
The differential wages simply reflect differential supply prices.
Of course one can discuss other extensions. There is an obvious
game theoretic aspect to our equilibrium notion since a particular eth-
nic group's union or lobby has its activities conditioned by and con-
ditioning the activities of another group's lobby. Another extension is
to have two urban centers rather than one. One could go on but I shall
conclude this section by saying that the model can be easily extended
to answer a variety of interesting questions that one sees posed in the
more popular literature.
7 . Models of the Economy of South Africa
Next, I would like to say something about an "ethnic group" problem
par excellence
,
namely the economics underlying the system of Apartheid.
It seems to me that simple stylized models which illustrate the structure
of the economy of South Africa help us to understand the conflicts and
tensions which are inherent in the process of economic development. Of
course, in South Africa the solutions have taken a particularly extreme
form, but surely the insights they offer also have some relevance for
other contemporary economic systems as well as for the understanding of
our own colonial past.
It is somewhat surprising that there exist only a handful of studies
which attempt to model the South African economic system. Foremost
-21-
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among these is the work of T. C. Bergs trom, Mats Lundahl and
R. Porter. Let me now discuss one of the simpler models that has
been proposed by Lundahl and give you a flavor of the questions that
can be asked and successfully answered.
For the period corresponding to the first Dutch Settlement in 1652
up to the discovery of gold and diamonds in 1886, Lundahl proposes a
two sector model. Each sector produces the same commodity whose price
is exogenously given in the international market but one of the sectors
uses only native African labor whereas the other uses both African and
European labor. The allocation of land is non-shif table between the
two sectors and African labor is allocated on the basis of marginal
productivity pricing.
We are thus in the RV world described in Section 2. However, the
questions which can be asked of this model introduce subtle variations.
Lundahl focuses on two issues, namely:
1) the impact of increased European immigration, particularly
on European incomes,
2) the impact of the "alienation of African land."
The first issue, under neoclassical assumptions, reduces to the
investigation of an increase in labor supply and one obtains the stan-
dard RV results here. The wage rate for Africans falls, the return to
African land increases and European incomes increase. As can be
expected even from our cursory discussion of the RV model, no factor
intensity assumptions are needed.
This is not quite true when European land is exogenously increased.
This follows from the assumption that the quantity of land is finite
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and, if not in European control, it is being used by Africans. Thus an
investigation of (ii) involves taking two comparative-static investiga-
tions together, i.e., an increase in European land together with an
identical decrease in the land available for Africans. We thus obtain
the result that European incomes increase with land alienation if the
land-labor ratio is higher in the European sector than in the African
sector. Such a result is reminiscent of the HOS model.
Lundahl presents modifications of this model and applies them to
more recent periods of South African history. A particularly interesting
question relates to the impact of various policy changes on the incomes
and welfare of the unskilled European labor—what Lundahl terms the
"poor white problem." This is an important issue on account of the
conflict that arises between European demands for cheap labor and the
political pressures for a "civilized labor policy" that emanate from
the European section of the labor force. Even with a resolution of
this problem, we continue to have, in the words of Porter,
the dilemma of white policy. While white policy seeks
separation of the races, white living standards depend
(to some extent at least) on their ability to extract
gains from integration of the races. ^^
Before I move on to my next topic, let me underscore the fact that
the type of modeling that I have briefly described is particularly well
suited towards answering a question of great topical interest; namely,
the impact of trade restrictions on native African welfare and on white
attitudes towards change. This question can be dispassionately studied
in the context of simple theoretical models which would not only give
us a deeper understanding but also indicate what empirical questions
need to be formulated and answered.
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8. Forced Labor
My discussion of the South African economy and of the concept of
'land alienation 1 leads me directly to a variety of institutional
arrangements that can all be grouped under the rubric of "forced labor."
Such arrangements have not yet been incorporated into well-articulated,
general equilibrium models but, in my view, such studies are overdue.
In any case, they deserve more prominence than is typically accorded
to them in standard textbooks.
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The primary contribution here is that due to Neiboer ' and his
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hypothesis has been given a modern rendering by Domar. The essential
idea is as simple as it is tantalizing. Consider a world where land
and labor are the only factors of production. In such a set-up, the
strength of non-economic institutional constraints on labor are
directly related to the land-labor ratio. Consider, for example, an
economy which is labor-scarce and land-abundant. For such an economy,
the principal constraint is on the availability of labor, and property
rights to land are simply not worth very much on account of the fact
that there is so much land to go around. In such a situation, the
landowners, if they are to survive as a group, must impose noneconomic
constraints which bind labor to their land. Slavery, of course, is one
81
such constraint, but as Kloosterboer argues, this is just one possible
solution. Indeed, land alienation and the separate homelands option of
South Africa is another solution. However, there have been several
others and I would like to present a brief listing of some of these.
A solution that was particularly popular during the first fifty
years of colonization in Latin America was the encomienda system.
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Here the Indian natives kept access to their own land but were
"allocated" to the encomendero to whom they were bound till the rest of
o o
his life. The latter provided "instruction in the Christian religion
and the application of the basic elements of European culture" while
the 30-300 Indians provided labor, provision of food, clothing etc.
Payment for this work was antithetical to the system since by living in
close contact with the Europeans, they were already receiving free
instruction in Christian doctrine and on how to avoid indolence and
lead an industrious way of life.
A variant of the encomienda system goes under the name of repar-
84timiento or mita . Under this system, Indian labor was drafted and
paid wages determined by the state. Labor was assigned to projects
which were imperative for the welfare of the state and these included,
in addition to public works and labor for monastries, private agri-
cultural, animal husbandry and mining enterprises. The essential
point, of course, is that the state was preventing the free play of
market forces and assigning a wage lower than the equilibrium one.
As we move into more recent times, forced labor acquires less crude
forms. There is the system of debt-bondage or debt peonage whereby a
laborer is led into debt which is then transmuted into labor services.
Debt peonage occurs, for example, in the American South after the
abolition of slavery.
A variant of debt-bondage is the Hacienda system . Here the labor
of a particular plantation is obliged to buy all of its provisions from
and only from, the plantation shop. Needless to say, the shop extends
credit and this credit can be repayed in terms labor services. In the
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context of the Hacienda system, we see emerging, what in modern jargon,
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is termed interlinked markets . An identical agent is both landlord
and merchant and uses his role in one market to influence his role in
another.
One can discuss other arrangements which make their appearance in
the modern colonial period. There are the vagrancy laws which render
unemployment legal offense whose punishment, not surprisingly, is a
certain amount of labor service. There are "head" taxes which are
payable not in "kind" but only in money. These ensure that labor can-
not retreat into a subsistence sector but has to become part of the
labor force.
One could go on but let me conclude my discussion of this set of
issues by a brief mention of interlinked markets in some of the agri-
culture systems in our subcontinent. Here, the interlinkage takes the
form of the identity of the landlord and the moneylender. As analyzed
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by Bhaduri in the context of Bengal, this gives rise to several
interesting consequences, foremost among them being the fact that it
may be in the landlord's interest to retard technical progress.
However, a natural question arises as to the reason for high rates of
interest and consequent debt-bondage in a labor-surplus economy. In
such an economy, the landlord does not need invoke extra-economic con-
siderations to ensure a plentiful supply of labor. In an imaginative
90PDR paper, Datta-Chaudhuri has given an answer to this question in
terms of rural-urban migration. If I had the time, I would show you
how his model can also be seen as a variant of the HOS and RV models
discussed earlier. Instead, I shall simply refer you to his work.
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9. North-South Trade
My final topic for this lecture relates to modeling international
economic relations between the developing and developed countries, both
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conceived as aggregated groups. Since the Brandt report, this has
been popularized under the term North-South trade.
As I had occasion to remark earlier, even in my brief discussion
of the standard trade models, one is impressed by their symmetrical
structure. In particular, there is no recognition given to the fact
that a commodity which can be produced in a particular country can
simply not be produced in another. Note that by this I mean not pro-
duced as a consequence of geography and not as an equilibrium outcome a_
la Ricardo. It would be fair to say that asymmetries relating to both
product and factor markets lie at the very essence of North-South trade.
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There is by now a small but increasing number of studies devoted
towards the formalization of North-South trade. I would like to
discuss, in the remaining time allocated to me, two of these models.
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The first is a pioneering contribution of Kemp-Ohyama. In their
model, North produces manufactures using capital and a primary resource
which is only available from the South. The South is also specialized
and produces the primary resource with capital as the only input. Both
capital and the primary resource are allocated on the basis of marginal
productivity pricing. In this simple model, the unknowns are the pro-
duction levels of manufactures and the primary resource, the inter-
national allocation and rental of capital and the returns to the fixed
factors in both countries.
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In this setting Kemp-Ohyama investigate a variety of policy
measures. It is clear that the South can interfere with the price at
which its resource is sold to the North and impose a tax which is
optimal from its point of view. This is the familiar optimal tariff
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argument of Beckerdike-Graaf f but it is now applied to an intermediate
commodity. What is at first surprising is that there is no optimal tax
which the North can impose on the South. To put the same observation
another way, Northern welfare keeps increasing as North keeps on
increasing the price of manufactures that it charges the South. Kemp-
Ohyama conclude from this that there is no limit to which the North
can exploit the South. This result, of course, is simply a consequence
of the fact that as far as the South is concerned, it has no substitute
for Northern manufactures and the North is simply exploiting the fact
that the South must buy manufactures until it is totally impoverished.
This same observation can perhaps be more succinctly summarized by
the statement that Northern manufactures in the Kemp-Ohyama world also
serve as food.
As one would expect, these conclusions can be overturned in more
95disaggregated models. In a recent PDR paper, I have introduced a
food sector for the South. This not only allows an unspecialized
equilibrium for the South but also introduces the problems for the
allocation of labor. One interesting result in such a set-up is that
the first-best policy for the South prompts an interference in Southern
labor markets; specifically a tax on Southern labor working in the
primary resource sector. This result can be seen as dual to the Kemp-
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Negishi argument on tariffs being optimal ( 2nd best optimal) in the
presence of labor market distortions.
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In my work, with Datta Chaudhuri and Po-Sheng Lin, I have also
introduced surplus labor in the South a. la Arthur Lewis. The results
are interesting and indicate the need for more systematic study.
10. Concluding Remarks
I would like to conclude this talk with three observations.
My first observation relates to the use of mathematics in develop-
ment economics. Whereas it is certainly true that a more mathematically
sophisticated model does not by itself lead to more economic insight,
it is equally true, it seems to me, that it does not necessarily offer
less. To put the matter another way, rigor may at times also lead to
content and the final judgment must be on the basis of the economics
and not on the language.
My second observation relates to the lack of robustness in the
conclusions derived from simple two-sector models. As I had occasion
to illustrate, the results change dramatically with changes in the
number of outputs and primary inputs. But this, it seems to me,
illustrates the strength and diversity of the subject matter rather
than a weakness. Why should we expect one model to be robust in terms
of the conclusions it yields and yet apply to a variety of economic
systems at various historical periods? Our subject of development
economics is a difficult one and the reasons for this are clearly
A W V 100expressed by Keynes.
Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models
joined to the art of choosing models which are rele-
vant to the contemporary world. It is compelled to
be this, because, unlike the typical natural science,
the material to which it is applied is, in too many
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respects, not homogeneous through time. Good econo-
mists are scarce because the gift for using vigilant
observation to choose good models, although it does
not require a highly specialized intellectual tech-
nique, appears to be a very rare one. 101
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In addition, I may add that such a lack, of robustness leads to the
particular problem being kept in focus and leads to an altogether use-
ful discouragement to the investigation of "grand" models and "grand"
ideas.
I began this lecture by emphasizing the importance and fruitfulness
of neoclassical economic theory. Let me conclude by a remark emphasizing
the importance of interdisciplinary studies. As development economists
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we simply cannot be constrained by the artificial boundaries of dif-
ferent disciplines and must read widely. Let me illustrate this remark
by mentioning an analogy which I have not had the time to develop and
which properly belongs in my discussion on North-South models. This is
the analogy of the economic problems of the current South with those of
the American South. The relevance of the study of the American South
for political thought and for world affairs has been brilliantly argued
by historians such as Potter and Woodward. I would also like
to emphasize the economic dimension. The antebellum and the postbellum
South was primarily an agricultural region specialized, by and large,
to a single agricultural commodity, cotton, and because of which it was
heavily dependent on international markets. It had "backward" labor
market structures and, both before and after the War, struggled to
achieve equality with the per capita incomes of the dynamic, indus-
trialized regions of the country. To the extent that it has or has not
succeeded, may have some useful lessons for us today.
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